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1. Introduction
Despite intensive research activity, there is still no clear consensus on the appropriate model of 
the  behaviour  of  individuals  when  making  choices  under  risk,  though  experiments,  both 
laboratory and natural, have greatly contributed to the understanding of how individuals take 
risky decisions.
Television shows provide a good natural context in which ordinary people face well-defined 
decision problems in a coeteris paribus environment, and in which players have the benefit of 
salient  incentives.  Studies using such data are able to overcome both the Harrison and List 
(2004) and the Rabin (2000) critiques to experimental methods in economics, concerning the 
inferential validity of estimates based on the typical economic experiment, i.e. based on a non-
representative sample and limited incentives provided by small money stakes.
Friend and Blume (1975), Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995) and Beetsma and Shotman (2001) 
measure individual risk attitude through television games in the US: Gertner (1993) and Friend 
and Blume (1975) obtained relatively high coefficients of risk aversion in data from the game 
Card Sharks and Beetsma and Shotman (2001) using data from the TV show  Lingo; instead 
Metrick (1995) found risk neutrality using data from the game Jeopardy!
This  paper  aims at  providing new evidence  on risk aversion,  while  focussing on an aspect 
insufficiently developed thus far, namely subjects' heterogeneity. The relevance of this topic is 
twofold:  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view,  by  showing  that  differences  among  people 
significantly affects their decisions, we highlight the need for theoretical developments which 
can better account for diversity. From an applied viewpoint, the statistical significance of such 
individual factors allows us to provide better estimates than works disregarding this issue.
Because it is clear that different participants in the game differ in crucial characteristics, and 
hence in order to give our models sufficient flexibility to fit the data, we introduce heterogeneity 
terms both in the form of observable and unobservable individual characteristics. The former 
includes  everything  concerning  players  that  can  be  observed,  like  his  or  her  gender,  or 
geographic origin;1 the latter involves all individual’s characteristics that cannot be observed, 
such as his or her optimism or pessimism, cultural background, etc.
In  order  to  identify  the  influence  of  the  unobservable  factors  we  require  that  several 
observations  for  each  player  are  collected,  and  that  these  are  handled  with  the  instruments 
proper to panel data analysis. Much is known about the appropriate way to deal with panel data 
models,2 even  though  introducing  panel  data  in  non-linear  models  causes  more  technical 
difficulties. We solve this problem using simulation techniques.3
We use data  collected  from from 298 showings of  a well-known game broadcasted on the 
Italian television  Affari Tuoi to estimate players’  risk attitude as a function of observed and 
unobserved heterogeneity factors. Affari Tuoi is the Italian version of the popular international 
format Deal or no Deal, produced by Endemol.
The paper  is  structured  as follows.  In section 2,  the basic  rules  of  the television game are 
presented, with some references to the existing literature on other editions of Deal or no Deal; 
section  3  presents  some  descriptive  statistics  about  our  sample.  Section  4  presents  the 
econometric  models  to be  estimated,  while  in section 5 the empirical  results  are  presented. 
Section 6 concludes.
2. Game description 
The Italian edition of  Deal or no Deal exhibits some minor variations from the international 
format. Specifically,  Affari Tuoi is developed as a 5-step stop-and-go game between a player 
and a Banker or Auctioneer. The game starts with 20 players, one from each of the 20 Italian 
regions. They are randomly assigned 20 sealed boxes, each containing a prize drawn from a 
know distribution (see Table 1). Boxes’ contents range from € 0.01 to € 500,000: the average 
prize is € 52,545.83; the standard deviation of prizes is € 117,639.07; the distribution of prizes 
is highly skewed.
Table 1.  Prizes as displayed to players
€  0.01 €  5,000
€  0.20 €  10,000
€  0.50 €  15,000
€  1 €  20,000
€  5 €  25,000
€  10 €  50,000
€  50 €  75,000
€  100 €  100,000
€  250 €  250,000
€  500 €  500,000
One player is selected to actually play the game by means of a funny question: the fastest 
candidate who answers correctly plays the game.4 The game then proceeds as follows. In each 
of  the  5 rounds,  the  player  opens  a  fixed  number  of  boxes  (6  in  the  first  round,  3  in  the 
following), losing the possibility of winning the prizes contained therein. Between every two 
1 Harrison and Rutström (2005).
2 Baltagi (2001) and Peracchi (2001).
3 Gourieroux and Monfort (1996); Stern (2000); Train (2003).
4 The questions are usually so naïve (e.g. the number of time the word “amore” appears in Dante's Divina Commedia) 
that no one can possibly answer but by chance. Hence, we will assume that players are randomly selected, though with a 
presumption of self-selection of the original 20 candidates of individuals keen of appearing on TV.
rounds, the Banker makes an offer: he either offers the player the opportunity to change her box 
with any of the remaining ones (“swap”), or he can offer a certain amount of money to the 
player to quit the game. If the player accepts the money, the game ends; otherwise she proceeds 
to the next round.  If  the player  gets  to the final  round without having accepted any of the 
Banker’s money offers, she wins the content of the box owned at that stage. 
Figure 1.  Typical decision round  
As Andersen et al. (2006a, 2006b, 2006c) notice, three main estimation strategies have been 
developed  to  test  hypotheses  on behaviour  under  risk  within  Deal or No Deal.  We briefly 
discuss them here. 
The most simple method is to develop qualitative indicators which usually lead to scarce but 
definitive conclusions: for example, by comparing the money offer with the expected value of 
two remaining prizes at the last game round, risk-loving, indifference to risk, or risk-aversion 
can be inferred immediately. Many authors make this kind of analysis as a preliminary step to 
more structured estimations,  and Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2006a and 2006b) use qualitative 
indicators to formally test hypotheses. 
Alternatively,  it  is  possible  to  define  a  theory  of  behaviour  which  can  lead  to  testable 
predictions, as a monotonic function of only one parameter. The typical example is to assume 
expected utility  behaviour  (EU),  with  CARA or CRRA functional  forms,  implying that  the 
highest offer rejected, as a percentage of the continuation value of the game, sets a maximum 
value for individual's risk aversion, while the offer possibly accepted sets a minimum value. The 
advantage  of  this  technique  is  that  it  allows  individual-specific  estimates,  at  the  cost  of 
providing only intervals of values, frequently not closed (for individuals who never accept the 
Banker's offers) and possibly empty (for individuals not behaving consistently according to the 
simple model of choice assumed). Henceforth, this method is employed in several works as a 
preliminary  analysis  of  data  (exception  being  Deck  et  al.  (2006)  and  Post  et  al.  (2006)). 
Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) extend this analysis to an interval regression of the estimated 
bounds, in order to investigate the role of possible sources of observed heterogeneity among 
contestants.
Finally, it is possible to define a latent structural decision process and estimate a logit or 
probit model as a function of the model's parameters.  This is the approach followed by the 
present paper as well as by Andersen et al. (2006a, 2006b, 2006c), Mulino et al. (2006), Post et 
al. (2007), Sarafidis and de Roos (2006). Table 2 summarizes the most recent literature on the 
topic.
Table 2.   Existing contributions to Deal or no Deal
 
Andersen, Har-
rison, Igel Lau, 
Rutström 
(2006)
Bombardini and 
Trebbi (2005)
De Roos, Se-
rafidis (2006)
Deck, Lee, 
Reyes (2006)
Mulino, 
Scheelings, 
Brooks, Faff 
(2006)
Post, Balthussen, 
Van dem Assem, 
Thaler (2007)
Sample 211, United Kingdom 252, Italy 399, Australia 52, Mexico 102, Australia
51 Netherlands, 
47 Germany, 53 
United States
Estimation 
Strategy Probit
Interval Regres-
sion
Boundary Ana-
lysis, Probit
Boundary Ana-
lysis
Boundary Ana-
lysis, Logit Probit
Theory of 
Behaviour EU, RD, CPT EU, CPT EU, RD EU EU EU, CPT
Functional 
Form Expo-power CRRA CARA, CRRA CARA, CRRA CRRA Expo-power
Wealth   * Estimated
0, ALI, ALIx10 
(based on demo-
graphics)
0, ALI 0, ALI, “high” ALI (based on postcode) Estimated
Demogr. No
Age, sex, region, 
employment and 
marital status, # 
children (partly 
imputed)
No No
No, (age and 
gender for 
boundary ana-
lysis)
No
Unobserved 
Heterog. No No Yes No No No
Horizon Static, Dynamic Static, Dynamic Static, Dyna-mic
1-step forward, 
Dynamic
Static, Dyna-
mic 1-step forward
Expecta-
tions
Rational Expec-
tations, stocha-
stic
Rational Expecta-
tions, stochastic 
and deterministic
Rational Ex-
pectations, de-
terministic
Rational Ex-
pectations, sto-
chastic
Rational Ex-
pectations, 
stochastic and 
deterministic
Rational Expecta-
tions, determini-
stic
  
Notes: for each reasearch group, only the latest paper is reported. Papers by Blvatskyy and Pogrebna (2006a and 2006b) on Ita-
ly's edition of DOND are not considered due to their different methodology and dataset. 
*    ALI = Average Labour Income.
We analyse players'  answers and consider only the instances when the Banker makes a 
monetary offer, because the models of behaviour we consider would predict perfect indifference 
over changing box. In the flourishing literature on  Deal or No Deal; Blvatskyy and Pogrebna 
(2006a and 2006b) consider also choices over the swap, on a subset of the Italian database.
We represent players' decisions as a choice between the Banker’s offer and a lottery which 
consists in the possibility of winning any of the remaining prizes with equal probability. In other 
words,  we  assume  that  contestants  behave  myopically,  in  they  consider  the  possibility  of 
winning one of the remaining prizes in a subsequent node of the game, but they neglect the 
future Banker offers (or assuming these offers will equal prizes' expected value).5
3.  The sample
In order to highlight the specifics of the Italian edition of the game, it is interesting to introduce 
the main characteristics  of  the observed sample.  We monitored 298 matches curiously split 
between 149 men players and 149 women (we recall that players were selected by means of a 
quick close-answer quiz game). Contestants are less evenly divided on a geographical basis: we 
5 No clear consensus has been reached thus far in the literature on  Deal or No Deal, on the validity of 
alternative hypotheses on players' myopia or on different degrees of forward-looking behaviour.  Several 
attempts  are  made  employing  boundary  analysis  techniques,  but  this  approach  does  not  allow  for 
measures  of  goodness  of  fit,  thus  impeding  a  formal  comparison  of  estimates.  The  only  attempt 
employing  the estimation of a structural model, hence using the same methodology as our paper, is made 
by Sarafidis and de Roos (2006). They provide estimates of both a dynamic and a static model of players' 
behaviour using a database from the Australian edition of  Deal or no Deal. They provide estimates of 
both the dynamic  and  the static  model,  but based on samples of  different  length,  and therefore  non-
comparable. 
record 115 players from Northern Italy, 75 from the Centre, 108 from the South, with a slight 
over-representation of women from Northern regions and men from Southern ones. Also, all 
regions are represented, ranging from 7 players from Calabria to 22 from Veneto. We do not 
discuss  here  on  the  representativeness  of  our  sample,  although  we  notice  that  sufficient 
variability in the sample is found, as to allow for the estimate of demographic covariates.
By comparing single showings, the mean of the Average Prize (AP) in each round proves 
considerably high and roughly stable until the fourth round (see Table 4), while the median AP 
is decreasing over game nodes. The standard deviation of AP shows an increasing trend, until it 
eventually  becomes  more  than  twice  as  high  as  the  mean  AP value.  Hence,  our  sample  is 
composed of rather  unfortunate  players,  but  with  a great  variance.  Instead,  due to the high 
variance of prizes at the beginning of the game, the  variability of prizes within single shows 
decreases as the game develops: on average, it ranges from 208% of AP at first round, to 86% at 
the 5th,  with absolute standard errors decreasing faster than mean AP. Initial  prizes are very 
diverse in all  the national editions of  Deal or no Deal,  and Post  et al.  (2007) interpret  this 
evolution as a decreasing complexity of the lottery involved. 
Only 4 players quitted the game at the second round, 12 at the third, 79 and 53 at fourth and 
fifth.  On average,  the average winnings are 31,158.63 euros, with a standard deviation of € 
56,396.14. That is, players win on average less than the game’s a priori expected value. Players’ 
winnings grow with the number of  rounds played,  as  confirmed by their  mean and median 
values per round. The only exception is represented by the last round when contestants refuse 
the Banker’s offer. At every round, winnings' standard deviation are smaller than the AP’s, but 
increasing. 
Summarizing,  our  sample  exhibits:  i)  decreasing  average  values  of  prizes;  ii)  increasing 
variability of prizes among players, but not along game rounds; iii) increasing winnings in game 
roounds (exception being the case of refusal of the last offer). In our sample, the longer the 
game proceeds, the higher are the final prize and the risk implied.
No significant differences emerge between men’s and women’s winnings (their means are 
respectively  €  29,155.44  and  €  33,161.81,  and  standard  deviations  €  53,567.50  and  € 
59,202.89).  Winnings  differ  instead  across  geographical  areas:  contestants  from  Northern 
regions perform more closely to the average values of the sample; players from Central regions 
win less than the average, with a smaller spread (mean € 24,762.32 and standard deviation € 
37,731.70); the mean and the standard deviation of the winnings for players from the Southern 
regions are respectively  € 38,176.60 and € 77,550.05, both higher than the average value of the 
sample.
Table 3.   Descriptive Statistics
Average Prize Mean Std. Dev. Median
Round 1 52,083.27 18,040.43 55,393.62
Round 2 52,611.53 23,854.52 53,944.36
Round 3 52,134.2 33,218.37 46,910.18
Round 4 50,664.48 46,185.59 29,100
Round 5 41,092.12 69,307.32 12,500.05
Final Prize
Round 2 16,000 8,485.281 16,000
Round 3 18,125 8,361.505 16,000
Round 4 25,653.41 16,119.17 25,000
Round 5 45,212.98 51,143.8 30,000
End 29,721.68 77,197.32 250
Average 31,158.63 56,396.14 15,000
Women 33,161.81 59,202.89 15,000
Men 29,155.44 53,567.5 17,000
North 28,691.77 41,783.91 15,000
Centre 24,762.32 37,731.7 13,000
South 38,176.6 77,550.05 20,000
In Table 4 the history of  players’ choices is summarized: it is clearly shown how, as a rule, 
contestants are given the chance to choose the box they will own after the first node. 
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics
Number of Observations
Players SwapOffer Acceptance
Money 
Offer
Mean Std.Dev. Acceptance
Round 1 298 293 72 5 € 3,200 € 1,351 0
Round 2 298 9 4 289 € 6,584 € 6,584 4
Round 3 294 33 12 268 € 7,790 € 7,790 12
Round 4 284 37 9 251 € 16,388 € 16,388 80
Round 5 204 96 40 109 € 32,844 € 49,304 54
4. The EUT choice model
We assume that utility for player  i  is defined by a classical Constant Absolute 
Risk Aversion (CARA) preference functional,6
i
i
i R
xR
xU
)exp(
)( , (1)
where x is the lottery price and Ri is the individual-specific risk attitude parameter. 
During the game, players are confronted with binary choices between a lottery, 
where they can win with equal probability, one of the left boxes, and a degenerate lottery 
where they can win with probability 1 the amount of money offered by the Banker. The 
game is made of 4 rounds, indicated by n, n=1,…,5.
Let EUin be the expected utility of the lottery in round n for player i, that is the 
probability weighted utility of each outcome left in round n,
nk
nkinkin
xUpEU )( , (3)
where pkn , with kn = 1,…,Kn , is the probability of the outcome k in round n.
6 The utility functional is appropriately normalized, such that Ui(0)=0 and Ui(max(x))=1. We also run all 
the estimations assuming CRRA and Expo-power functionals, assuming a non-zero wealth level to be 
estimated  as  a  parameter  of  the  model.  We  do  not  report  the  corresponding  results  because  they 
systematically  fit  the  data  worse  than  the  CARA  specification,  and  provide  no  different  economic 
insights.
Let  Ui(offn) be the utility of the amount offered to player  i in round  n by the 
Banker.
Player i chooses between playing the lottery or accepting the offered amount the 
option that maximizes the difference
inniinin offUEUU )( , (4)
where in is a Fechner-type error term (Hey and Orme, 1994), with in ~ N(0, σε2). It can 
be seen as a computational error in calculating utilities: the larger  σε2, the greater the 
computational error.
Actually, what we observe is the variable Uin = 1 if individual i in round n prefers the 
lottery, otherwise Uin = 0 if individual i in round n prefers the offer. The model is then 
described by:
1inU        if       0inU
0inU        if       0inU .
(16)
Each game is composed of several binary choices, such that for each player we 
observe a sequence of 0 and 1, corresponding to players’ choices at each stage of the 
game. Then, the likelihood contribution of player i is the joint probability of observing the 
sequence of outcomes ( Ui1,…, UiN),
),,,( 1 iiiNii RXUUfL , (7)
where Xi represents the sequence of lottery prices in player i’s game. To handle this joint 
probability we need to make assumptions on the error term in  and on the independence 
of  observations.  In  effect, as our sample contains repeated observations  on the same 
player, we cannot discard the hypothesis that these observations are correlated. In a linear 
random-effects panel data model, this situation is generally handled by introducing an 
individual-specific intercept in the model, referred to as unobserved heterogeneity, which 
is assumed to have a particular distribution across individuals. What is left of the error 
term is therefore independent of  everything else in the model. In contrast, our latent 
dependent variable is non-linear in the parameters to be estimated. In this case, to control 
for individual correlation we have at least two options: 1) assume that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is  part  of  the Fechner-type error term (so  that  this  component  can  be 
perceived as  contestant  i systematically  overvaluing or  undervaluing the  difference 
between the expected utility of the lottery and the utility of the Banker’s offer); 2) assume 
that there is a systematic individual-specific component in the risk aversion parameter 
that is normally distributed across the population:
s
iii uzR . (7)
Here  a constant and uis reflects unobserved heterogeneity, with uis   N(0, σu2), such that 
Ri  N(  + z’α i β, σu2). 
After controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity in one of these two ways, we 
are allowed to assume that  in are independently and identically distributed, with  in ~ 
N(0,  σε2),  and independent of everything else. Our choice falls on the second option 
because we want to capture the heterogeneity of players’ risk attitude highlighted by other 
studies about Deal or No Deal.7 This specification allows us to estimate the distribution of 
the risk attitude parameter across the population. Such a distribution has a mean that 
varies with the demographic characteristics of the player and a variance that accounts for 
the spread of the risk attitude across the population.
As we assume that all  in are independent over choices, we can write this joint 
probability as
),,,,( 1 iiiNii zXUUfL 
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We also allow for the possibility of sub-optimal behaviours, introducing a tremble 
parameter, w, that measures the probability that players choose completely at random in 
some of  their  choices.8 It  accounts  for  a  concentration mistake,  that  is  we take into 
account  the possibility that  players loose concentration somewhere in the game. The 
tremble parameter goes to zero if players behave optimally; on the contrary, it goes to 1 if 
their choices are completely random. With this parameter the last line of eq. 8 becomes
s
i
u
s
i
u
s
iiiin
n
du
u
uzXUf )(
1
]}
2
),,,()1[({ . (9)
Finally, we maximise the total log-likelihood 
log L=∑
i=1
298
ln Li . (10)
by maximum simulated likelihood. We use simulation techniques because the Gauss-
Hermite quadrature is  extremely computationally intensive in  our case,  and there are 
simulation  techniques  like  the  Halton  sequences  we  use  here  that  reduce  the 
computational burden of the estimation.
5. Econometric results
To estimate players’ risk attitude and to study the determinants and the extent of 
observed and  unobserved  heterogeneity, several  different  model’s  specifications are 
estimated, including the explanatory variables listed in Table 5. Five of these models are 
reported in  Tables 6 and 7.9 Table 6 shows the simplest specifications of the model, 
without unobserved heterogeneity, as well as another specification obtained by adding the 
7 See, among the others, Bombardini and Trebbi (2005). 
8  Loomes, Moffatt, and Sugden, 2002.
9  The other results are available from the authors upon request.
demographic dummies. Table 7 lists some specifications of the model with unobserved 
heterogeneity, differently combined with the demographic variables. 
Table 5.  Description of the variables included in the analysis
unobserved 
heterogeneity
37250 (125 per player) random draws 
from  a  standard  normal  density 
obtained through a Halton sequence 
dummy sex dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the player is a male, 0 otherwise
dummy north
dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if the player is from the North of Italy, 
0 otherwise
dummy south
dummy variable taking the value of 1 
if the player is from the South of Italy, 
0 otherwise
The last line of  Tables 6 and 7 provide the negative log-likelihood values. We use 
these values to check for the improvement in the likelihood function of an unrestricted 
model over a more parsimonious one, and to determine the improvement in the fitting of 
nested  models.  Likelihood ratio tests  are  performed for  all  nested  models, the  most 
significant are reported in Table 8. Under the null hypothesis, the statistic has a Chi-
squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
All the specifications in Table 6 are estimated by maximum likelihood. It emerges 
that , the constant component of the risk aversion parameter, is positive and statistically 
significant under all the specifications of the model, highlighting players' risk aversion. 
Also,  its  value  does  not  vary  considerably  when  new  variables  are  added.  All 
demographic dummies are not statistically significant at a reasonable significance level, 
and the log-likelihood is unchanged by the addition of these variables.
Table 6. Probit model - Maximum likelihood results 
(observations 923, groups 298) 
(1) (2)
0.01087
(0.00052)
0.00979
(0.00102)
dummy sex 0.00000
(0.00103)
dummy north 0.00133
(0.00121)
dummy south 0.00172
(0.00128)
σε 0.05870 0.05731
(0 .00471) (0.00485)
w 0.05180
(0.00013)
0.05652
(0.00016)
log-likelihood -310.43394 -310.33925
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 7 reports specifications including unobserved heterogeneity: all the models 
are estimated by maximum simulated likelihood.10 To introduce unobserved heterogeneity 
in our model we used 37,250 random draws (125 per player) from a standard normal 
density obtained through a Halton sequence based on primes.11 
The unobserved heterogeneity parameter seems to play a very important role in all 
the specifications, as its standard deviation is always quite high, relatively to the mean of 
the risk aversion parameter. The estimated constant component of the mean of the risk 
attitude  parameter,  ,  is  still  positive  and  strongly  statistically  significant  in  all 
specifications, but its magnitude varies considerably depending on the covariates included 
in  the  specification. Specifically,  the  parameter is  increased by  the  introduction  of 
unobserved heterogeneity, while it returns to levels comparable to those reported in Table 
6 when adding geographical dummies. 
Most notably, the constant term is substantially lowered by the introduction of 
unobserved heterogeneity and the full set of demographic covariates: it reduces of almost 
a  half  if  the dummy sex is  introduced in the estimation.  The demographic dummies 
denoting geographical origin  are never found statistically significantly different  from 
zero; the dummy sex is statistically significant at the 5% level when introduced jointly 
with  the  unobserved  heterogeneity term  and  the  other  demographic dummies.  The 
constant  term  is  lowered  by  its  introduction,  and  the  dummy  sex  coefficient  is 
significantly greater than zero, showing that in our sample risk aversion is higher for men 
than  for  women,  contrarily to  the  most  part  of  evidence on  gender  risk  attitude in 
experiments.12
 
Table 7. Random effect probit model - Maximum simulated likelihood 
results (observations 923, groups 298)
(3) (4) (5)
0.01148
(0.00091)
0.01062
(0.00273)
0.00654
(0.00249)
0.00882
(0.00110)
0.00882
(0.00110)
0.00865
(0.00104)
dummy sex 0.00419
(0.00184)
10 See, for example, Gourieroux, C. and A. Monfort (1996).
11 Halton sequences is a variance reduction tool  to take random draws from a density function. These 
draws are shown to have a self-correcting property over observations.  Such a property performs better 
when the number  of  random draws for  observation  is low (about  100),  relatively to other  simulation 
techniques. Further details are found in Train, K. (2003).
12 Schubert, R., Brown M., Gysler M. and H. W. Brachinger (1999).
dummy north 0.00099
(0.00300)
0.00305
(0.00247)
dummy south 0.00095
(0.00327)
0.00334
(0.00273)
σε 0.03951
(0.00622)
0.03936
(0.00627)
0.03919
(0.00587)
w 0.00364
0.00009)
0.00364
(0.00011)
0.00364
(0.00012)
log-likelihood -94.24548 -94.18431 -93.46472
Standard errors in parentheses
Likelihood-ratio  tests  show  that  all  the  specifications including  unobserved 
heterogeneity (table 7) fit substantially better than those not including that variable.
According  to  likelihood-ratio tests,  specification (3),  including only  the constant  and 
unobserved heterogeneity, fits relatively better than specifications (4) and (5), containing 
the demographic variables. Hence, adding unobserved heterogeneity leads to a significant 
improvement  of fit  in  all  instances,  whereas further covariates, such  as demographic 
variables, seem not  to  give an improvement  in  the fitting which  justifies the lost in 
parsimony of the model. As a general result, we find that more complex models are 
always rejected in favour of the most parsimonious  ones, provided that they include 
unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 8. Comparing  alternative specifications of the model
Competing specif ications Likelihood-ratio  test  stat ist ic
1.  speci f icat ion  (3)  v/s  speci f ication  (1)  432.67392      ( χ12 )
2.  speci f ication  (4)  v/s  speci f ication  (3)  0 .12234         ( χ22 )
3.  speci f icat ion  (5)  v/s  speci f icat ion  (3)  1.56152        ( χ32 )
The distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis is reported in brackets.
6. Conclusions
We use data from 298 showings of the television programme “Affari Tuoi”, which 
involves players taking decisions between risky prospects with outcomes up to half a mil-
lion euros, to estimate a models of decision making under risk assuming that players are 
expected utility maximiser. 
Interestingly, in contrast with the prevailing experimental literature, we find that 
the CARA specification fits significantly better than the conventionally-adopted CRRA 
specification and also of the more general Expo-power specification.
We take into account both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in players’ atti-
tude to risk. The latter allows us to obtain not just a point-estimate, but the whole distribu-
tion of the risk attitude parameter over the population. Crucially, we find that unobserved 
heterogeneity plays a significant role, implying that our estimates provide superior estim-
ates of risk attitude than other studies. It actually does not seem to significantly influence 
the mean of the risk aversion parameter, but the fitting of the model significantly im-
proves according to likelihood-ratio tests.  
As far as observed heterogeneity is concerned,  the only relevant demographic 
variable seems to be  dummy sex. Interestingly, this dummy variable shows that in our 
sample the mean of the risk attitude parameter is higher for men than for women, contrar-
ily to the most part of the evidence on gender risk attitude in experiments.
Overall, the introduction of the unobserved heterogeneity reduces significantly the 
standard deviation of the Fechner-noise error term. This means that, after controlling for 
heterogeneity in players’ risk attitude, almost nothing is left to the error term to be ex-
plained.
The  estimates of  the  tremble parameter show that  just  a  small  proportion  of 
players choose completely at random in their choices. Its magnitude is close to 5% in the 
specification without unobserved heterogeneity, but it reduces to 0.3% when unobserved 
heterogeneity is included.
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